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*the lack of time to obtain a warrant and the easily destructible nature of the
narcotics.
The second ground relied on by the majority in Wiley was that the
police- could continue a criminal investigation to confirm an anonymous
tip and determine whether the suspect should be detained or released. As
the dissent argued, this is completely untenable. 46 The majority's reasoning
would completely nullify the warrant requirement because anytime the
police wanted to continue a criminal investigation they would be allowed
to make a warrantless search. 47 Continuing a criminal investigation
has
48
never been recognized as an exception to the warrant requirement.
In Wiley the Missouri Supreme Court adopted the destruction/removal
exception to the warrant requirement. Unfortunately the court chose the
wrong vehicle to give its approval to the exception, because the facts in
Wiley do not satisfy the limitations placed on the exception by the federal
courts. If Wiley is taken literally, police will have an unfettered discretion
to search whenever there is even a remote possibility of removal or destruction of evidence. Because such a possibility almost always exists, the exception would abrogate the warrant requirement. 49

A.

WAYNE CAGLE, JR.

SECURITIES REGULATION-STANDING TO SUE
UNDER RULE 10b-5-SUPREME COURT
ADOPTS BIRNBAUM DOCTRINE
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores'
In 1963 the United States sued Blue Chip Stamp Company and nine
co-defendants, charging them with conspiracy to restrain trade and with
monopolizing the trading stamp business in California.2 A consent decree
was entered providing for the merger of Blue Chip Stamp Company into a
new corporation, Blue Chip Stamps. The new corporation agreed to divest
itself of 55 percent of its outstanding shares by offering these shares, consisting of common stock and debentures, to nonshareholding retail users
46.
47.
48.
49.

522 S.W.2d at 298.
Id.
Id.
White, The Fourth Amendment as a Way of Talking About People: A

Study of Robinson and Matlock, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 165, 182.

1. 95 S. Ct. 1917 (1975).
2. The nine co-defendants together owned 90 percent of the shares of Blue
Chip Stamp Company (Old Blue Chip). The original cause of action was based
on alleged violations of sections I and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ I & 2
(1970).
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of the stamps in proportion to their past usage. 3 All shares not purchased
by the retail users were to be sold on the open market. This had the effect
of reducing the holdings of the majority shareholders of Blue Stamp Company (Old Blue Chip). The existing shareholders of Old Blue Chip registered the offering with the SEC and issued a prospectus that allegedly

fraudulently underestimated the new company's earnings and worth.4 By
discouraging offerees from accepting this "bargain offer" the shares could

later be sold on the open market at a higher price. Manor Drug Company,
an offeree, filed an action in district court alleging violations of Securities
and Exchange Commission Rule l0b-5, 5 as enacted under section 10 (b) of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1984.6 Manor's complaint stated that it
had relied on the misleading prospectus, thereby failing to purchase the
units offered.
The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted.7 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.8 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit. The only issue
before the Supreme Court was whether Manor had standing to bring the
lOb-5 action "without having either bought or sold the shares described in
the allegedly misleading prospectus." 9
Rule l0b-5 was promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission to implement legislation which was a result of the New Deal era. The
two basic statutes enacted for the purpose of regulating securities were the

3. 492 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1973). The offering price made to the
retailers was $101 per unit. Each unit consisted of three shares of common stock
and one debenture. The fair market value of each unit was $315.
4. 95 S. Ct. at 1921.
5. Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1969), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1970). The section provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the commission may prescribe....
7. 339 F. Supp. 35 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
8. 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973). The only issue that plaintiff pursued on
appeal was rule lOb-5. See text accompanying notes 43-45 infra.
9. 95 S. Ct. at 1921.
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Securities Act of 193310 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,11 designed to prevent fraud and inequitable and unfair practices, respectively.
Whereas the 1933 Act provided expressly for private civil actions, 12 neither
section 10 (b) of the 1934 Act nor rule lOb-5 provided for such' actions.
However, an implied right of action was recognized in Kardon v. National
Gypsum Company, 13 enabling defrauded investors to bring suit for their
losses. In Kardon plaintiffs alleged that defendant corporation fraudulently
induced plaintiffs to sell stock they owned in two corporations for less
than its true value. In ruling that defendant's conduct gave rise to liability
under the 1934 Act and rule lOb-5, the court held that although no'express
provision existed for allowing private causes of action, "in view of the
general purpose of the Act, the mere omission of an express provision for
civil liability [was] not sufficient to negative what the general law im14
plies."
Standing to bring such private actions has been the subject of great
controversy. Lacking any specific statutory standards, courts have resorted
to the legislative history of the 1934 Act to determine the intent of Congress, as well as the express language of rule lOb-5. 15
The landmark case in this area is Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Cor.10. 48"Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et. seq. (1970).
11. 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1970). It should be
noted that these two acts respond to different problems. Wfhereas the 1934 Act
is primarily aimed at regulation of the trading markets, the 1933 Act concerns
itself more with the problems surrounding the issuance of shares to the public.
12. Section 11 (a) gave a right of action by reason of a false registration
statement to "any person acquiring" the security, and § 12 gave a right to
sue the seller of a security who had engaged in proscribed practices with
respect to prospectuses and communication to the person purchasing the
said security from him.
95 S.Ct. at 1922.
13. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). See also I A. BROMBERG, SECURIMES LAw:
FRAUD § 2.4 (1967). Bromberg states that the implied right of a civil cause of action
is primarily derived from two theories, statutory tort liability and statutory voidability. Statutory tort liability is derived from the common law doctrine that a person should be entitled to recover from injuries sustained as a result of a violation
of a statute enacted "for the benefit of persons in his position." Id. See 2 RrSTATEMENT oF TORTS, § 286 (1934).
14. 69 F. Supp. at 514. Bromberg also refers to the Kardon decision as a basis

for his second theory, that of statutory voidability. A.

BROMBERG,

supra note 13,

at § 2.4 (1) (b). The Kardon court recognized that the implied right of action
could also be based upon section 29 (b) of the 1934 Act which provided that con-

tracts made in violation of any provision of that Act would be void.
It seems to me that a statutory enactment that a contract of a certain kind
shall be void almost necessarily implies a remedy in respect of it. The
statute would be of little value unless a party to the contract could apply to
the Courts to relieve himself of obligations under it or to escape its consequences.
69 F. Supp. at 514. See Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967) (shareholder's derivative action asserting a claim
for damages based on section 10 (b) of the 1934 Act and rule lOb-5; held, plaintiffs

allowed to bring the action belonging to the corporation due to their status as
stockholders).
15. See Note, 8 GA. L. Rav. 487, 490-91, nn.21 & 24 (1974).
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poration.16 That case firmly established a limitation on standing known as
the Birnbaum doctrine, requiring plaintiffs to be either purchasers or sellers of securities before they can assert a lOb-5 claim. Birnbaum was an action
against the president of Newport Steel by the corporation's shareholders. Defendant had rejected a merger offer 17 which would have been beneficial to the corporation. He then sold his stock to Wilport Corporation at
twice the market value for the sole purpose of making Newport a captive
subsidiary of Wilport at a time when there was a market shortage of steel.
The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint. The
court reasoned that plaintiff lacked standing to sue under rule lOb-5 because neither the corporation nor the stockholders were "purchasers" or
"sellers" of securities. The court based its ruling upon the purpose behind
the adoption of rule lOb-5. It noted that prior to the adoption of the rule,
the only provision concerning fraud with respect to the purchase or sale
of securities was found in section 17 (a) of the 1933 Act, which only made
it unlawful to defraud purchasers of securities. Because there was no protection for sellers, the Commission adopted rule 1Ob-5.18 Also, except for
the substitution in rule lOb-5 of the words "any person" for "the purchaser,"
and the addition of a final clause, "in connection with the purchase or-sale
of any security," section 17 (a) was identical to rule lob-5. Citing section
16 (b) of the 1934 Act, the court also noted that when Congress wanted
to provide a remedy to stockholders for corporate mismanagement, it had
no trouble in doing so expressly.' 9
Since the Birnbaum decision in 1952, courts have avoided an express
ruling on the validity of the purchaser-seller limitation. By finding various
ways to categorize plaintiffs as purchasers or sellers, the impact of :Birnbaum was apparently weakened. 20 The doctrine has been relaxed somewhat
in'suits for injunctive relief 2' and in other cases courts have circumvented
16. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1953).

17. Defendant was also chairman of the board and controlling stockholder of
Newport Steel.
18. See SEC Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942).
19. 193 F.2d at 464.
20. See Note, 8 LoYou. L. REv. 171, 174 n.7 (1975).

21. Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967). The
court granted standing to seek injunctive relief even though plaintiffs were neither
buyers or sellers of securities. Applying the rationale of SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963), which held that in a suit for equitable or

"prophylactic" relief, all the elements required in damage suits need not be established, the court recognized that suits for injunctive relief had nothing to do with
the issue of causation. Therefore, there was no need to apply the Birnbaum doctrine. The court noted that injunctive relief might "cure harm suffered by continuing shareholders" and "afford complete relief" against rule lOb-5 violations in
the future without experiencing the problem of proof inherent in a damage suit.
384 F.2d at 547. See also Kahan v. Rosentiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 950 (1970). Some courts have interpreted Kahan as applying only to suits
for injunctive relief. Edelman v. Decker, 337 F. Supp. 582, 584 (E.D. Pa. 1972).

Others have followed its rationale in damage suits. Tully v. Mott Supermarkets,

Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834, 841 (D.N.J. 1972).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss2/13
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the doctrine by classifying plaintiffs as "forced" sellers or purchasers of securities.
In Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co. 22 plaintiff was classified as a seller
even though no shares were transfered. Plaintiff had refused to exchange his
shares of A corporation (which had merged into B corporation) for shares
of B corporation. The court granted plaintiff standing. The court recognized that his only option, other than selling his stock to B corporation at
less than its true value, was to keep stock in a nonexistent entity. The court

said: "(I)t is precisely because [Beneficial] gives no choice to Vine under
the statute and the latter must now exchange his shares for cash that
[Vine] can now be deemed a seller." 23 The court noted that it was "all part

of a single fraudulent scheme" and that the policies of section 10 (b) and
rule lOb-5 justified the holding that the fraud was "in connection with"
the forced sale to B corporation. However, the court did not overrule the
24
-purchaser-seller limitation because the plaintiff was found to be a seller.
The forced purchaser situation arose in A.T. Brod and Co. v. Perlow.25
Plaintiff alleged fraud in connection with defendant's refusal to pay for
stock which he had authorized plaintiff to purchase, after the market value
of the stock had declined. Referring to SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc.,2 6 which said that securities laws should be construed "flexibly
to effectuate... tlieir remedial purpose," the court stated:
We believe that Section 10b and Rule lOb-5 prohibit all fraudulent schemes in connection with the purchase or sale of securities,
whether the artifices employed involve a garden type variety of

fraud, or present a unique form of deception. Novel or atypical

21
methods should not provide immunity from the securities laws.

However, the court refused to consider the Birnbaum rule with respect
to the Commission's view that the doctrine was too narrow. 28 Even though
the court was liberal in finding standing, it did not abandon the purchaser-seller limitation, because plaintiff was found to be a purchaser. 2
In addition to the forced seller and purchaser decisions, other courts
recognized an abortive purchaser-seller exception where plaintiffs estab-

22. 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1970).

23. 374 F.2d at 635.
24. Id. Cf. Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir.
1969), applying the rationale of Vine to a tender offer and merger situation.
25. 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967).

26. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
27. 375 F.2d at 397 (emphasis omitted).
28. "We need not consider that contention since appellant is dearly a purchaser of securities." Id. at 397 n.3.

29. For a good discussion of the methods used to modify the purchaserseller limitation, see Boone & McGowan, Standing to Sue Under SEC Rule 1ob.5,
49 TEx. L. REv. 617, 629-46 (1971). See also The Purchaser-SellerRule: An Ar,
chaic Tool For Determining Standing Under Rule lOb-5, 1 Suc. L. Rxv. 447, 450
(1969).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
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lished that, but for the defendant's fraud, their purchase would have been
completed. 30
While these courts were expanding the standing doctrine, others were
narrowing it, producing inconsistent results."- Some commentators argued
that the Birnbaum doctrine had been completely eliminated3 2 while others
awaited a Supreme Court ruling on the matter.3 3 The Court had such an
opportunity in Superintendent of Insurance v. Banker's Life and Casualty
Company.34 However, the Court expressly declined to rule on the purchaser-

seller requirement. 35 According to Professor Bromberg, Banker's Life did
eliminate two other restrictions established by Birnbaum, thereby leaving
only the purchaser-seller requirement as a limitation on standing.386
It was arguable that Bankers Life had abandoned the Birnbaum doctrine altogether. However, Bromberg recognized that even though the
Court expressly approved Brod's expansion of section 10 (b) to include "all
fraudulent schemes" having to do with the purchase or sale of securities,
by declining to rule on the standing limitation, the validity of that limitation was left to later interpretation.3 7
30. Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 715, 718-19
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (defendant's fraud prevented the consummation of an agreement
to purchase securities). But see Keers v. American Steel & Pump Corp., 234 F. Supp.
201, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (the abortive-seller distinction was rejected as a basis of
conferring standing).
31. Compare Iroquois Industries, Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963
(2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970), with Crane v. Westinghouse, 419
F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969). See also Mount Clemens Industries v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339
(9th Cir. 1972). Plaintiff brought an action under rule lob-5 claiming defendant
prevented plaintiff's sale by a misrepresentation that the securities were worthless.
In refusing to grant the plaintiff standing, the court denied that the Birnbaum
doctrine had been eroded by later decisions, stating that the doctrine has been
interpreted "flexibly, not technically and restrictively" to promote the congressional purpose in the rule's enactment. 464 F.2d at 341.
32. Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era For Rule
10b-5, 54 VA. L. Rrv. 268 (1968). For lower court cases rejecting the Birnbaum

doctrine, see Young v. Seaboard, 360 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Utah 1973); Tully v. Mott
Supermarkets, Inc, 337 F. Supp. 834 (D.N.J. 1972).
33. See Boone & McGowan, supra note 29, at 649.

34. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
35. Id. at 13-14.
36. See A. BROMBERG, supra note 13, at § 4.7.
37. Bromberg breaks the Birnbaum decision down into three restrictions.
The first is that section 10 (b) was directed "solely at that type of misrepresentation or fraudulent practice usually associated with the sale or purchase of securities." 193 F.2d at 464. Bromberg states this was rejected by Brod, which expanded the scope to include "all fraudulent schemes in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities, whether ...a garden type variety of fraud... or a
unique form of deception." 375 F.2d at 397. The second restriction was that
rule lob-5 was not directed "at fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs."
193 F.2d at 464. A. BROMBERG, supra note 13, at § 4.7. The third restriction was
that rule lob-5 extended protection only to the defrauded purchaser or seller. 193
F.2d at 464. The Court in Banker's Life approved the Brod court's rejection of the
first restriction. 404 U.S. at 11. It undermined the second, deeming irrelevant the
fact that the fraud was perpetrated by an officer of the company. 404 U.S. at 10.
It declined to consider the third. Bromberg stated: "After Banker's Life then,
Birnbaum survives significantly only for the buyer-seller requirement which has
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss2/13
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After Banker's Life, the Seventh Circuit in Eason v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp.3s rejected Birnbaum in favor of a more liberal standard
emphasizing causation. 3 9 The court rejected previous arguments that Birnbaum should be retained to "forestall an unmanageable flood of federal
litigation" 40 and "to preserve national consistency" 41 with respect to federal securities law. The court firmly stated that the Birnbaum doctrine "is
not part of the law in this circuit."42
In Blue Chip 43 the Ninth Circuit based its decision to grant standing
for the class of injured offerees on the existence of "objective evidence" of
causation. The court noted that earlier decisions granting standing to nonpurchasers and non-sellers found such evidence in the contractual relationship between parties.4 4 The majority opinion stated that a consent decree
45
served "the same function" as a contractual relationship.
In reversing, the Supreme Court found the Birnbaum rule applicable.
The Court based its decision on five principles. First, the Court argued
that Congress' failure to reject Birnbaum, when coupled with past judicial decisions supporting it, evidenced congressional acquiescence in the
doctrine.4 6 Secondly, extrinsic evidence from the 1933 and 1934 Acts, although not conclusive, supported Birnbaum.47 Third, policy considerations
favor acceptance of the rule.48 The Court believed that vexatious litigation
would result if the class of plaintiffs who could sue under rule lOb-5 were
expanded 49 and also feared that strike suits would result if standing were
been much reduced by later decisions." A. BROMiBERG, supra note 13, at § 4.7 (emphasis added). Regardless of whether Bromberg's analysis is accurate, the fact is
that the validity of the purchaser-seller limitation was left open by the Court, subject to later interpretation.
38. 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).

39. The emphasis on the injured party's status as an investor indicates
that the protection of the rule extends to persons who in their capacity as
investors, suffer significant injury as the direct consequence of fraud in
connection with a securities transaction, even though their participa-

tion.., did not involve either the purchase or the sale of a security.
Id. at 659.
40.
panded
660.
41.
42.
43.
44.

The court noted that the amount of lOb-5 litigation has already exand will continue to do so regardless of the adherence to Birnbaum. Id. at
Id. at 661.
Id.
492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 141-42. The court's basis for this reasoning was that objective evi-

dence of the plaintiff's intent to purchase "but for" the defendant's fraud can be
siphoned from such contracts, thus establishing causation.
45. Id. at 142.
46. 95 S. Ct. at 1924. The Court noted that the SEC has twice asked Congress
to change the wording of section 10(b) from "in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security" to "inconnection with the purchase or sale of, or any attempt
to purchase or sell any security." Because Congress failed to adopt the change,

acquiescence in Birnbaum may be inferred.
47. Id. at 1924-26. The Court pointed to section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, just
as the Birnbaum court had done. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
48. Id. at 1926-32.

49. Id. at 1927-32. One of the arguments of the Court was that absent the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
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granted under rule lOb-5 on the basis of an offeree's word that he failed
to buy stock (and thus lost out on a bargain purchase) due to a misrepresentation of the seller. Fourth, the Court was of the opinion that a consent
decree did not serve the same function as a contract. 50 Those who had contractual rights to purchase securities have been recognized as "purchasers"
or "sellers" because of the express provisions of the 1934 Act, and not because they were "similiarly situated" to actual purchasers or sellers. 51 Fifth,
the Court emphasized the fact that affirming the Ninth Circuit's decision
would expose the doctrine to a case by case erosion which they believed
would be an unsatisfactory means of establishing liability for "the conduct
52
of business transactions."
Justice Powell's concurring opinion gave further support to the Birnbaum doctrine by emphasizing that there is nothing in any provision of
the 1934 Act or in its history to support the proposition that the term
"sale" in section 10 (b) included "offers to sell." 5 3 Such an inference would
make for highly speculative issues with respect to the testimony of plain54
tiffs who were mere offerees.
Three members of the Court dissented, criticizing the "arbitrary principle of standing" laid down by the majority. . 5 They were of the opinion
that the test for standing should be based upon the existence of a "logical
nexus between the alleged fraud and the sale or purchase of a security." 56
The Court's decision signifies a halt to the liberalizing trend which
has been underway since the Birnbaum decision in 1952. Unfortunately, it
is not certain what effect this case will have in the future. Clearly there
has been an affirmance of the purchaser-seller limitation on standing, but
it is not clear when the limitation will be applicable. The Court did not
expressly overrule the forced purchaser and seller distinctions expressed
by the Second Circuit in Vine and Brod. Thus, there is reason to believe
Birnbaum limitation, the suit would have settlement value which could frustrate
or delay normal business activities. Abuse of the federal discovery rules would
also be likely in addition to the many "bad" cases which would add to the already
crowded dockets.
50. Id. at 1932. The Court distinguished a consent decree from a contract
by stating that consent decrees are not enforceable by those who are not parties
to them. Because the decree was between the United States and Blue Chip Stamps,
plaintiff had no enforceable right under it.
51. Id. at 1932-33. Section 3(a)(13) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)
(13) (1970) states: "The terms 'buy' and 'purchase' each include any contract to
buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire." (Emphasis added). Section 3(a)(14) of the
1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1970), states: "The terms 'sale' and 'sell' each
include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of." (Emphasis added). Congress
left out the language of "offers" which originally appeared in the two abovequoted sections. The Court used this in support of its decision upholding the
Birnbaum doctrine.
52. 95 S.Ct. at 1934.
53. Id. at 1935.
54. Id. at 1936.
55. Id. at 1937.
56. Id. at 1940, 1942.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss2/13
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that this circuit will continue to grant standing to those meeting the requirements of these cases, limiting the application of Blue Chip.5"'
Blue Chip can also be interpreted as the mere failure of the Court to
apply a recognized exception to the Birnbaum doctrine to the facts before
it. As previously noted, where a contract to purchase securities exists, Birnbaum has been held not to apply.5 8 The Blue Chip Court refused to equate
contracts to purchase with consent decrees, thus rendering the exception
inapplicable.
The decision in Blue Chip does not prevent a plaintiff from bringing
an action in state court for common law fraud. However, he will still
have to meet certain standing requirements. In Missouri such a plaintiff
would have to meet nine requirements in order to state a common law
cause of action for fraud, one of those being a showing of injury.59 It is
questionable whether such injury could be found in Blue Chip because
plaintiff did not act to his detriment, but merely failed to act for his own
benefit.
Theoretically, it seems that the dissent's approach of considering such
standing questions on a case by case basis, using the "logical nexus" test,
is desirable. This would insure proper plaintiffs a chance to recover for
injuries sustained due to fraudulent practices, irrespective of whether plaintiff actually bought or sold the security. However, in practice, those plaintiffs who suffer injuries but fail in their attempt for compensation due to
the Birnbaum limitation will be small in number. There probably will be
few deserving plaintiffs bringing their complaints to the courts who will
not be purchasers or sellers, at least within the prevailing definition of the
terms. The cost represented by those whose otherwise compensable injuries
go unremedied60 is far outweighed by the benefit inherent in the prevention of massive litigation by non-deserving plaintiffs.

57. See Walner v. Friedman, CCH FED. L. REP. ff 95,318 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). This
case, decided after the Supreme Court decision in Blue Chip, was a shareholder's derivative action under rule lOb-5 where neither plaintiff-shareholders
nor their corporation were purchasers or sellers of securities. The court noted the
affirmance of the Birnbaum doctrine in Blue Chip, but distinguished cases relied
on by plaintiffs including Vine and Brod. This indicates the court's willingness
to continue to apply Vine and Brod to limit the Birnbaum doctrine, should the
circumstances so warrant.
58. See.note 44 and accompanying text supra.
59. See Toenjes v. L. J. McNeary Const. Co., 406 S.W.2d 101, 106 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1966) (substantial injury and damage must be proven in order to
recover for fraud in Missouri). See also John T. Brown, Inc. v. Weber Implement
& Auto Co., 260 S.W.2d 751 (Mo. 1966); Dolan v. Rabenberg, 360 Mo. 858, 251
S.W.2d 150 (1950).
60. Bromberg indicates that non-purchasers and non-sellers might still be
able to gain something in a suit for injunctive relief:
Although a major justification for dropping the buyer-seller requirement in injunction suits is that they are preventive rather than compensatory, they may have significant monetary aspects. They may support
pendent jurisdiction for state damage claims. . . . And establishing a
violation in a derivative or class suit for injunction may entitle plaintiff
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
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